Miguel Octavio, head of research at Venezuela's leading investment bank BBO, takes us through the regional election map and explains what the wins and losses mean for Chavez, the Opposition and the future of Venezuela.
The Venezuelan opposition won in five states and the Metropolitan area of Caracas, gaining ground with respect to Chavez’ PSUV, as it won in the four most populous states in the country, but Hugo Chávez managed to limit the gains to these five states, blocking dissident Chavismo from winning anywhere and scoring a big victory at the levels of races for mayor.
While a look at the map of Venezuela indicates a huge victory by Chávez’ PSUV (Red States) versus the opposition (Blue States), the numbers suggest otherwise. Chávez did win 17 of the 22 states, but the opposition won where the large population concentrations are.
The opposition won all but one of the states it was expecting, surprisingly losing Sucre State, but winning all important Miranda state, the second largest state in the nation. In addition, the opposition managed to win the race for Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas, which was too close to call and had been in the hands of Chavismo since 2000. With this win, the opposition scored a huge victory in Caracas, also winning four of the five municipalities which comprise the Metropolitan area.
In the end, Chávez’ PSUV obtained 53.4% of the total number of votes, while the opposition, including dissidents, received 46.5%, but the difference between the two of 480,000 votes, can mostly be accounted by a single state, Lara, where popular pro-Chávez candidate Henry Falcón obtained 78% of the vote as both sides voted overwhelmly for him. Falcón is not a favorite of the President and was at one point ready to run alone if Chávez’ PSUV did not nominate him.
While all races for mayor are not in, it appears as if the opposition did not do as well in local races due to the myriad of divisions across the country with Chavismo obtaining control of over 70% of all the mayoral races based on preliminary numbers.
Divisions within the opposition did have a harmful effect in at least two states. Bolívar and Yaracuy could have been won by the opposition if they had not fielded more than one candidate. In the end, dissident Chavismo added little to the opposition as they failed to gain a single Governorship, despite polls suggesting they would have a strong showing in three or four states. Chávez’ home state of Barinas was won by his brother in the only hotly disputed race at the Governor level. The loser, a former Chávez supporter, claims he can prove he won.
For Chávez, the results represent an important political defeat as the possibility of a new Constitutional referendum being approved by the people to allow his indefinite referendum seems remote given these results. However, they also represent a victory for him as his party was able to contain the opposition’s victory to the expected states, as there were few surprises.
Curiously, Chávez’s effort at banning opposition politicians from running was mostly wasted as the opposition scored victories in three of the four races where important candidates had been banned and the fourth was the one most unlikely to have gone for the opposition in any case.
Two opposition parties, Rosales’ un Nuevo Tiempo and Primero Justicia, consolidated themselves as the top two new forces in Venezuela’s political landscape as they obtained more votes nationwide than any of the old parties of the 4th Republic. Two new faces from these two parties scored significant victories: In Zulia State, Maracaibo’s mayor Pablo Perez won handily and his new position should give him the visibility he deserves. In the Sucre municipality of Caracas, Primero Justicia’s Carlos Ocariz won with 55% of the vote -- including the populous barrio of Petare, formerly a Chavez stronghold -- which should allow him to project himself in the future. Two new faces to watch for.
Thus, it is not a clear win for either side. Both sides won and lost. For the opposition, controlling fives states establishes a power base that will allow it to run more effectively in future campaigns. After all, Chavez has made used of the Government’s resources for the benefit of his candidates, overwhelming the opposition in the size and intensity of the campaign. Even if the Governors don’t have as many resources, they should be able to provide some counterbalance to the current biased conditions.
In theory, there should not be any new elections until 2010, when Venezuela will choose a new National Assembly. Given the likelihood that the country will be forced into a large economic adjustment before then, the opposition should be able to gain some ground on Chávez before then.
However, it does sound like Chávez will try to push another constitutional referendum next year and based on his initial statements, he will clearly continue to push his revolutionary agenda in 2009.
- Miguel Octavio is the Executive Director in charge of research at BBO, Venezuela's leading investment bank.
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